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 Leo   van  Garsse 
 Introduction 
 In the list of topics and questions addressed with regard to probation, that 
of reparation cannot be neglected. Indeed, for a couple of decades now, 
the prominence of reparation and restoration in the list of goals of public 
intervention in the aftermath of crime has been obvious. Th e original jus-
tifi cation of criminal justice (CJ) as a symbolic re-confi rmation of moral 
order as a ‘public good’ has tended to give way to a modernist, pragmatic 
approach. Herein the notion of ‘justice’ is conceived as a ‘function’ in a 
society focussed upon maximising a climate of security, likely to promote 
an atmosphere of well-being among the citizens. In this line, and more 
in particular after the Second World War, doing justice was seen more 
and more as a matter of public service, to be managed as effi  ciently as 
possible. In a context of worldwide disintegration of traditional commu-
nities, the theme of victims’ need for reparation showed up as a matter 
of political credibility. Th e individual ‘victim’ became recognised as the 
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holder of specifi c group of civil rights, to be responded to by the state. 
Moreover, the victim’s social surroundings were also to be recognised as 
an important stakeholder in the provision of criminal justice. Doing jus-
tice thereby was seen as, at least partly, an aspect of community-building 
with prominence given to the role and to the interest of the individual 
or the communal–collective victim, with both in a position of claiming 
the right to be properly compensated for the damage done through the 
off ence. 
 Th e notion of ‘restorative justice’, with origins in the USA and Canada 
from the 1970s onwards (Aertsen  2004 ) found its way with remarkable 
ease through the UK and Western Europe to actually become a criminal 
policy approach that is well known everywhere and respected in circles 
both of the UN and of the Council of Europe. Th e general idea is the 
elaboration of a criminal justice system focussed upon the actual repa-
ration of harm rather than upon retribution of the ‘wrong’ done (Zehr 
 1990 ; Aertsen  2004 ; Walgrave  2008 ). Th e symbolic and the abstract have 
to give way to the ‘real’ and the tangible. Th is is one reason at least to ques-
tion punishment, as well as its alternatives, on their reparative potential. 
 In answering the question in the title of this chapter, my point of view 
is that of a pedagogue and a formal practitioner in victim–off ender medi-
ation in all sorts of criminal cases. More in general, I have been—and still 
am—a promoter of restorative justice in Flanders for more than twenty 
years. In April 2015 I completed a PhD research project analysing the 
development in Flanders of ‘ forensisch welzijnswerk ‘, a scheme launched 
in the late 1970s that focuses on every attempt in the sphere of criminal 
justice to promote the well-being of any person in any way involved, and 
thus including probation, victim assistance and restorative justice alike. 
 By practical experience as well as by research I feel strongly stimulated 
not to isolate CJ development and policies from their historical back-
grounds or from their socio-political contexts. To really know what we’re 
talking about, we cannot ignore the dynamics within which all sorts of 
decisions have been taken and all sorts of practices have appeared worth 
being considered and put into practice. Th is makes it diffi  cult to answer 
the question on the reparative impact of probation, either  in abstracto or 
in general. 
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 For starters, it’s no secret of course that probation and the notion of 
‘restorative justice’ are both rooted in the no-nonsense, straightforward 
approach of self-organisation characteristic of the USA in particular 
and of the Anglo-Saxon countries in general. Reading the work of de 
Tocqueville ( 1963 [1835]) today in the surroundings of a country like 
Belgium, it is still hard not to share, at least partly, some of the fascina-
tion of this French aristocrat with the diff erences between a continen-
tal European and an ‘overseas’ conceptualisation of both democracy and 
(criminal) justice alike. Moreover, it’s still far from diffi  cult to recognise 
the same ‘cultural’ diff erences in discussions that take place today outside 
offi  cial discourses. For similar reasons, seen from a Belgian perspective 
and taking a position some mental distance from what appears to be 
actually considered universal ‘common sense’, the question in the title 
of this chapter seems very Anglo-Saxon to me. Th erefore, in trying to 
answer it, I’d like to contextualise and somehow develop the terms in 
which it was formulated. 
 The Notion of Reparation: Is There Something 
to Repair? 
 Literally, ‘reparation’ as a goal of CJ intervention suggests the reconstruc-
tion of the situation, just as it was before the incident. And using instead 
the word ‘restoration’ might even sound worse. 
 We might wonder whether these goals are at all realistic. To the extent 
that crime is perceived as an intersubjective ‘event’, some philosophers 
would see it as something that cannot be undone, and that should, apart 
from every temptation to dramatise, be appreciated as such in the pursuit 
of justice (Arendt  2007 [1964]; Derrida  2003 ; Biesta  2009 ). We might 
wonder also whether something such as the ‘reparation’ of the harm done 
to the victims can be taken care of by a system or some organised pro-
cedure, and then result in a predictable an measurable outcome, with-
out stealing it from the parties involved (see Christie  1977 ). Unless, that 
is, reparation could actually be reduced to the transfer of an amount of 
money, objectively determined.
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 Experience shows that in Belgium at least, victims of crime often perceive 
the promise of being ‘repaired’ as an insult. Confronted with this systemic 
‘goal’, they don’t feel they have been taken seriously in regard to what they 
have experienced. Th is probably is one of the reasons why victims of seri-
ous off ences would—at fi rst—rather reject ‘reparative/ restorative mea-
sures’ as buying off  their right to further complain and as a theft of their 
place and identity in ‘their’ case. (Van Garsse  2004 ) 
 Advocates of victim’s rights might perceive such resistance as an indi-
cator of secondary victimisation caused by the very off er of mediation 
(Th e European Forum for Victims’ Services  2004 ). Th eir plea is for a rigid 
and careful selection of the few cases that are considered ‘safe’ enough 
for a victim–off ender dialogue, or ‘light’ enough to allow for a respon-
sible application of a ‘merely reparative’ measure. A recent directive of the 
European Parliament on victims’ rights aims to achieve the same protec-
tive atmosphere and stresses the right of the victim to refuse to accept 
formally any attempts at reparation, beyond a unilateral fi nancial transac-
tion (Dir. 2012/29/EU: art. 12). 
 Other scholars have for quite some been warning of the inherent lim-
itlessness of the victim’s right to reparation. Th ey consider it at the least a 
false, misleading promise within the context of modern judicial proceed-
ings, bound as they are by such principles as equality, legality and propor-
tionality (Fijnaut  1983 ; Gutwirth and De Hert  2002 ,  2011 ). Moreover, 
the victim might feel forced into the role of ‘good victim’, so as to be 
likely to fi t expectations of being not only damaged but ‘hurt’ as well, and 
therefore ‘in need of reparation’ (Van Dijk  2008 ). Many mediators would 
confi rm that having to play the role of the victim, especially in cases of 
minor crime, can indeed be perceived as a burden: During my work in 
developing victim-off ender mediation in Flanders, I got both surprised 
and fascinated by the heterogeneity within the group of those identify-
ing with the position of ‘victim’. Th e notion of ‘victimship’ appeared to 
be constituted by a broad range of diff erent emotions and expectations. 
Still, looking closer, in every case one need was present as a prominent 
constitutive factor: the need the gain some ownerschip of their situation, 
to be of infl uence, not to be overruled (again), even if – paradoxically- the 
desire was not to be involved any longer (Van Garsse  2004 ,  2012 ,  2013 ). 
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 Inspired by research on ‘procedural justice’ (Rawls  1999 ) and by quite 
some experience in victim–off ender mediation, I too would advocate care-
ful use of the word ‘reparation’ and even ‘restoration’ as aims for any public 
intervention in the sphere of formal criminal justice, let alone as criteria for 
a successful policy. Popular pleas for the victim’s right to be repaired tend 
to formalise, organise and ‘instrumentalise’ what ought to be respected as 
aspects of the atmosphere of the personal, the subjective and the unpredict-
able (Van Garsse  2004 ; see also Derrida  2003 and Biesta  2006 ). Maybe 
we should change our vocabulary from ‘reparation’ and ‘restoration’ to 
‘respectful co-involvement in doing justice’ (Derrida  2001 ,  2003 ). Th ereby 
the focus shifts from the authoritarian projection of a desired outcome to 
an open, process-oriented invitation of civic capacity (Van Garsse  2012 ). 
 The Notions of ‘Community’ and/as ‘Victim’: 
Between Reality and Projection 
 In the same line of thinking, even the notions of ‘victim’ and ‘commu-
nity’ are lacking clarity. 
 On the one hand, the concept of ‘victim’ can be defi ned broadly as 
‘every person/organisation economically, emotionally … aff ected by the 
event’. Th is broad defi nition includes the families of the off enders, the 
neighbours, the friends, the school and so on. In a republican view like 
that of Braithwaite and Pettit ( 1990 ), they’d all have a say in the out-
come of the case. But what about legal security of the parties involved 
(Gutwirth and De Hert  2002 )? 
 On the other hand, the notion of ‘victim’ can also be restricted to 
those recognised by the judicial authorities as formal stakeholders in a 
specifi c fi le. But then, of course, many concerns among citizens would 
be neglected and doomed to appear as ‘irrelevant’ for the case. In this 
approach, criminal justice risks becoming alienated from social reality 
and is likely to cause forms of secondary victimisation to citizens not 
being taken into account by public authorities. Th is brings us back to the 
original motifs for the promotion of restorative justice (Christie  1977 ; 
Zehr  1990 ; Aertsen  2004 ). 
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 Putting the victim and the community on the same line is a com-
mon feature of restorative justice literature (Braithwaite and Pettit  1990 ; 
Walgrave  2008 ). But I still have some uneasy feelings about it. Th e very 
Anglo-Saxon concept of ‘community’ does sound rather vague in a very 
much urbanised, bureaucratised and multi-cultural Belgian society. Th e 
term tends to provoke feelings of nostalgia, with reference to the fading of 
the ‘ community ’ under the still growing pressure of a neo-liberal ‘ socialisa-
tion ’ (Bauman  2000 ; Sachβe  2003 ). Compared with the era of small rural 
villages where generations of people used to have a strong common sense 
of values in life, today an average street in a Belgian city is generally char-
acterised by people who are not really connected, unless by merely ‘func-
tional’ bounds. Of course, even then, communities exist, be it in a fl uid 
and hardly visible form (see Bauman  2000 ). Placed within the context 
of the struggling modern welfare states, the notion of community even 
carries the slight suspicion that it is composed of people looking out for 
their mutual benefi ts, even at cost of those of ‘the others’ (Huyse  1993 ). 
Obviously there’s a growing diff erence between ‘the community’ and ‘the 
collective’. Th is makes the idea of ‘the damaged community in need of 
reparation’, as one of the crucial stake-holders in ‘doing justice’, far from 
self-evident. Seen from everyday Belgian reality, the attribution of the 
victims’ role to the community in the context of criminal policy risks 
being reduced to a cheap justifi cation of—every—public intervention 
(see Duff   2001 ). Th is becomes obvious on looking into the discussions 
about what kind of activities can be considered ‘ community service’, and 
which ones are likely to please only  some citizens. As we could observe in 
practice, even the cleaning of a public garden, an off ering of community-
service applied often, carries an enormous lot of presumptions that only 
marginally compare to by people’s actual experience. 
 As a result, the popularity of the community service order among the 
judiciary, be it as an alternative measure or as an autonomous sanction, 
sharply contrasts with the increasing scarcity of places of work that are 
ready to collaborate. More and more, one has to  organise community 
 service, and pay people to provide and supervise it, for the sake of alterna-
tive punishment. What are we really talking of here? 
 One might even say that the call for community involvement in the 
aftermath of a crime tends to be an attempt at constituting some sort 
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of community rather than actually repairing it. Th is social-constructivist 
thinking in terms of the ‘function’ of handling delinquency comes close 
to the ideas of Durkheim and others at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. But can our democracies still aff ord such a radical modern ratio-
nale, after the questioning of this instrumental reasoning by post-war 
postmodernity? Shouldn’t we redefi ne such a friendly notion as that of 
community? 
 Inspired by Hannah Arendt and Jacques Derrida, scholars like Biesta 
( 2006 ,  2009 ) and Mouff e ( 1989 ,  2005 ) state that democracy is in great 
danger of becoming itself a victim of the overall supremacy of a ‘needs’ 
approach, linking democracy to the tangible eff ects of equal distribution of 
‘satisfaction’ and ‘contentment’ among its citizens. Th ey wonder whether 
a democratic society can ever be a community unless it is one where the 
members have nothing in common and where communicating their 
mutual diff erences is a source of everlasting political debate and develop-
ment (Biesta  2006 ). Like Derrida ( 2003 ), they don’t see democracy as a way 
of organising the state, but as a perspective, always ‘to come’ (‘ la démocatie 
à venir ’) throng confrontation with the unexpected of the appearance of 
the respectable diff erent. In their view, ‘doing justice’ in a democratic way 
is not restricted to compensating the community and/or the victim for the 
harm done. It is about restoring them in their ability to engage in as process 
of change, proper to democratic dynamics. (Derrida  2003 ; Biesta  2009 ). 
 Th is line of thought questions the actual widespread popularity of 
restorative justice as a potential emanation of a merely conservative aspi-
ration to reconstruct existing power balances, amicably but quite eff ec-
tively disciplining those who oppose. In these terms, there’s no clear, 
everlasting model for democratic justice, neither is there one for the prac-
tices and procedures to promote it. And the fi rst question to be asked to 
a community presenting itself as being in a position to claim the right 
to be restored cannot be but: ‘Who exactly are you?’ Put like this, the 
reparation of the community is not so much a matter of compensating 
the harm done by the person accountable as a question of the attribution 
of identity and thus of social pedagogy through political debate (Biesta 
 1998 ,  2004 ,  2006 ,  2009 ; Valverde  1999a ,  b ; Derrida  2003 ). 
 Anyhow, it seems to be obvious that, from its appearance, the intro-
duction in criminal policy of the concern for ‘repairing the victims’ has 
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seen an emergence of ideological views, to a certain extent contradicting 
each other while all having to do with the balance of political power 
between the presupposed community of citizens and the state (Van Beek 
 1970 ; Gutwirth  1993 ). But to what extend is this type of approach still 
compatible with a concept and a practice like the one of probation? 
 The Notion of Probation: Repairing 
the Community or Testing the Offender? 
 Looking then not at the eff ect of probation as such but rather at its socio-
political context, what probation off ers comes more fully into focus. 
Th erefore, besides the terms ‘reparation’, ‘victim’ and ‘community’, even 
the notion of probation does not escape contextual contamination. Th is 
is obvious when we look at the variety of practices and policies that 
the umbrella of probation actually covers, some of them focussing on 
assisting vulnerable ex-off enders to maintain themselves in society, oth-
ers designed to control and prevent the phenomenon of delinquency as 
such (Fitzgibbon  2008 ; McNeill et al.  2009 ). Probation sometimes aims 
to prevent a public sanctioning, but sometimes serves, for the deserving 
off ender, as a conditional alternative to a more repressive sanction. 
 One common feature among all these diff erences is an obvious link 
between probation and community. In international circles probation is 
actually referred to as ‘community-oriented sanctions and measures’. But, 
even this apparent constitutive community involvement does not make 
clear the nature of the ‘community orientation’, leaving open whether 
the off ender is addressed  inside, because of, together with, or rather  by the 
community. 
 Originating in the United States in the middle of the 19th century, the 
notion of probation goes back to the private sphere, with citizens wanting 
to contribute to handling deviant behaviour in a context of civil solidarity 
and mutual care (Verheyden  1975 ; Peeters  1982 ). Very much in line with 
the pragmatic but very nuanced American way of building democracy 
(Tocqueville  1963 ), this contribution from the ‘community’, in its critical 
dialogue with the state, was able to manifest itself as a  valuable and con-
siderable alternative to state intervention. Step by step it provoked wider 
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interest and was given offi  cial legal status. In 1925 it was introduced into 
US federal law, as a way of doing justice to be made concrete in a variety of 
applications according to local circumstances in one or another American 
state (Verheyden  1975 ). In a way, practising probation was a matter rather 
of pedagogy than of justice, as it provided the off ender and the com-
munity a perspective on citizenship, seen as a cornerstone of the demo-
cratic project (Cornil  1937 ). From this point of view, the understanding 
of breaking a rule as damage to the community at the same time appears 
as a reality and—probably even more—a socio- political construct to be 
implemented to those applying for full citizenship. As observed by the 
Belgian scholar Cornil ( 1937 ), even in the USA the volunteering by citi-
zens in probation practice was generally symbolic rather than substantial. 
 Already, during the fi rst half of the 20th century, criminal policy- 
makers were quite aware of the US practices on probation (Peeters  1982 ; 
Verheyden  1975 ). But at the same time, they were fascinated by the polit-
ical translation of modernity in Germany, transforming the nation into a 
‘society’ that was directed by fi rm, goal-oriented central state power and 
identifying ethical as functional and useful for collective progress (Natorp 
 1964 [1905]; Nohl  1965 [1925]; Sachβe  2003 ; Fijnaut  2014 ). Moreover, 
the young and very much industrialised Belgian state was also rooted in 
a strong liberal rationale. 
 Th is interesting intermediate position of Belgium made that country’s 
criminal policy the birthplace of the doctrine of ‘social defence’. Th e idea 
was to protect the citizens against the disease of social disintegration and 
delinquency, which was leading to a growing disbelief in the project of 
a democratic national state (Prins  1910 ; Cornil  1934 ; Tulkens  1988 ). 
Seeking to reconcile individual responsibility and social determinism, 
social defence called for a nationwide mobilisation of forces to stimu-
late people to take a constructive part in society rather than give in to 
contamination by deviance. Under the medical motto that prevention 
is always better than cure, some socialist ministers of justice engaged in 
making the state take the lead in setting up actions to prevent victimisa-
tion rather than to make reparation for it. 
 Education was seen as the strategy  par excellence to improve the 
situation of those who on one hand were vulnerable to be aff ected by 
 delinquency (an off ender being in fact also a victim) but also on the other 
94 L. van Garsse
still able to integrate into society. It was seen also as a tool to carefully 
select those now beyond rescue, against whom society had to be pro-
tected, and to preventively isolate them—for always, if necessary. Tulkens 
( 1993 ) observes that, under the doctrine of social defence, criminal pol-
icy tended to distract itself from the criminal, the crime and the problem 
of punishment and justice. It did so in order to instead address, assist, 
educate and/or discipline society as a whole. 
 In the context of social defence the idea of probation was above all 
promoted as an interesting testing period, starting from the presumed 
capacity of every human being to take up responsibility. Th e same pro-
moters of probation problematised the use of repressive detention for 
being counterproductive from an educational point of view and in fact 
pointless from a strictly political one (Cornil  1937 ). After the Second 
World War however, very much in line with the ideas of the upcoming 
movement of ‘New Social Defence’ (Ancel  1965 ), they were dreaming 
of making probation the motor of a radical and urgently needed reposi-
tioning of ‘doing justice’ in post-war democratic societies. Th e idea was 
to focus upon the collaboration with the off ender, approaching him as 
a citizen, a holder of democratic rights, and upon his meaningful con-
tribution to the debate on how to handle the event. Notwithstanding 
their well-elaborated pleas, and given the quite promising results of some 
successive experiments, it took probation in Belgium till 1964 and many 
years of intensive and long-lasting political debate to be given a legal sta-
tus. In comparison with its enormous, almost revolutionary potential as a 
politically motivated concept (Verheyden  1975 ), the Belgian law on pro-
bation carried the smell of resistance and suspicion to what voices of civil 
society (‘the community’) could bring to the fore. Peeters ( 1982 ) suggests 
that the preparation of the law lacked suffi  cient communication with the 
judiciary. I would suppose, rather, that the post-war Belgian government 
very much wanted to strengthen the state in order to defend at least the 
formal unity of a Belgian nation, which was then internally more deeply 
divided than ever before (see also Huyse  1993 ). 
 Be that as may, instead of exploiting the opportunity of a radical repo-
sitioning of ‘justice’, the eventual law on probation rigidly restricted its 
scope to certain kinds of cases. Notwithstanding the fact that the legis-
lator claimed the embracing of the ‘subsidiarity’ of traditional punish-
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ment was a basic  principle (Cornil  1964 ), the application was restricted 
to a  practice of special individual treatment for only some cases that were 
considered too inconsequential to justify ‘real’ punishment. Instead of 
restricting repression in the name of subsidiarity, probation ran an enor-
mous risk of becoming a measure of net-widening, with all the ambiva-
lence of a favour (Cornil  1965 ). 
 Th ese initial fears were strongly confi rmed by practice. After a fi rst 
period of practice, many voices of probation offi  cers, academics and penal 
policy-makers expressed disappointment and frustration (Verheyden 
 1975 ; Dupont  1980 ; Peters  1980 ,  1982 ; Peeters  1982 ; Neirinckx  1981 ). 
 In 1985 in the Louvain district some local probation offi  cers set up an 
isolated experimental practice of community service, conceived as a sym-
bolic gesture made by the off ender of respect to ‘society’, and as a means 
to prevent recidivism (Baeyens  1993 ). Th e idea was partly copied from 
the 1965 law on juvenile protection(!), which provided the possibility of 
a measure of ‘philanthropic’ work. It was a promising idea which, how-
ever—for decades—was applied merely in some isolated cases and was 
hardly ever put into practice. Even in the context of probation it would 
take until the 1990s to have this optional supplement in the package 
of probation conditions to be more or less generalised. Not by coinci-
dence, this sudden promotion of community service took place as part 
of a crisis policy in the aftermath of a series of brutal murders. Th e goal 
was to demonstrate government’s ability to counteract any impression of 
impunity. In 2002 the measure, given the legal status of an autonomous 
sanction, suddenly started years of an enormous expansion, suggesting 
that, notwithstanding the educative and restorative potential, apparently 
almost all the slightly repressive aspect of a newborn ‘sanction’ was what 
public opinion and the judiciary were most interested in (Beyens and 
Aertsen  2006 ). 
 Putting the Victim Back on Stage 
 Th e entry into Belgium of victim–off ender mediation was the result 
partly of a discovery, partly of an ‘invention’. Belgian practice used to 
be far from in the lead in spending time and attention on the victim’s 
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rights to reparation. In fact, Belgium happens to have been one of only 
the most recent countries to follow the international recommendations 
on installing an offi  cial fund for victims’ fi nancial compensation and to 
fi nance, from 1984 on, some specialised professional care for victim assis-
tance (Peters and Goethals  1993 ). 
 Compared with Anglo-Saxon countries, until the late 1990s there 
was no real bottom-up victim’s movement in Belgium. Instead, the late 
development of victim assistance—in the midst of successive episodes of 
Belgian state reform, consisting of a gradual changing of the Belgian state 
into a federation of autonomous ‘communities’ ( Gemeenschappen )—was, 
from the very start, an area of intensive ideological as well as strategic 
debate on where to position and how to justify this new public interven-
tion, which had not arisen in response to any substantial request from 
citizens. 
 At the academic level, promoters of social work opposed the view of 
a group of critical criminologists. Th e former saw the development of 
specialised victim assistance as a logical step for the communities in their 
formal responsibility to promote, by means of a proper policy, a common 
atmosphere of well-being. Until then, victim assistance was seen as an 
empathic response to individual needs of a category of citizens, hold-
ers of specifi c civil rights, to be taken care of and—if necessary—to be 
protected against further harm. Th ese same academics embraced the per-
spective of a victimology, that was separate from considerations of crime 
and justice as such. Th e criminologists opposing them however wanted to 
address the victim above all as a crucial stakeholder in a process in doing 
justice, not in a detached, abstract and authoritarian way, but as com-
munication between meaningful approaches to a criminal event. Th eir 
view was above all oriented towards changing criminal policy, rather than 
towards responding to individual needs (Peters and Goethals  1993 ). 
 From the beginning of the 1990s onwards, the choice of the Flemish 
authorities, in search of how to establish a tangible sphere of autonomy 
for the provision of well-being, was obviously the fi rst of those just out-
lined. At the same time the federal minister of justice saw his depart-
ment confronted with a growing crisis in credibility owing to a perceived 
increase in crime and public insecurity. If (criminal) justice were to be 
transformed from an archaic symbol into a performant public service, 
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then the (potential) victim obviously was easier to reach and to please 
than the members of the growing group of off enders. Moreover, in 
the context of a constant increase in prison overcrowding, the growing 
policy- investment in responding to victim’s needs went also to serve as an 
implicit justifi cation of the implementation of a more rigid and repres-
sive penal policy (Peters  1993 ). In this reasoning, we got pretty close to 
returning to the original doctrine of social defence. 
 In the very same period, as a member of a small NGO working on 
alternative and educative measures for juvenile delinquents, I participated 
in an intuitive development leading towards a restorative approach (Van 
Garsse  2001 ,  2013 ). Starting from the idea of community service, a hith-
erto unused provision of the 1964 law, we discovered that in fact, given the 
concrete social context, this measure was rather more likely to stigmatise, 
shame and discipline than to actually make good any harm. Th erefore we 
decided to include the voice of the victim, presuming that average citi-
zens would be likely to encourage and appreciate ‘their’ young off ender’s 
engagement in some voluntary work for a common good. Interestingly 
enough, this nice presumption regarding the victim’s attitude obviously 
did not fi t the reality. However, victims in general appeared to be very 
open to the position and the interests of the youngster. Moreover, they 
were almost always very grateful to be approached and asked for their 
opinion on ‘their’ case. But, far from reacting vindictively or selfi shly, 
they above all wanted to be taken seriously by the system. Th ey were 
afraid that their being abused might be an easy justifi cation for some kind 
of manipulative concept, like that of the victimised citizen being part of 
a real ‘community’, waiting for reparation. 
 Th is sobering fi nding obliged us to radically redraw the whole project, 
transforming it from an alternative education of a misbehaving youngster 
into a process of critical communication. Such a process couldn’t do with-
out the involvement of the parents and couldn’t escape the very pragmatic 
issues surrounding bills and insurance claims. Finally, it couldn’t be blind 
to the logic of the right of the stakeholder to have at least a say in what 
should be done next, how and by whom, as well as a proper insight into 
the reasons behind the eventual decision. Without any in-depth notice on 
restorative justice or mediation, we were in a way constructing them intui-
tively, a fascinating and very rich experience, which was observed by some 
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local prosecutors with an increasing scepticism almost leading to a radical 
refusal to further refer any cases. Indeed, in quite some cases the process 
resulted in an outcome that nobody could have foreseen, and one not 
automatically in line with a rigid confi rmation of the social rule or with 
the logic of public intervention as such. To give one example: most victims 
appeared to be not pleased at all by the apparent signs of net- widening. 
Th ey then felt somewhat abused by being made cheap excuses for public 
disciplining. In the same sense they criticised any reference to the suff er-
ing of ‘the community’ as nothing more than an ideological construct. 
Instead they appeared to claim a certain ownership of their case, without 
however aspiring to take over the responsibility to judge or punish. 
 From 1993 onwards I took part in a research project of Louvain 
Catholic University, on the introduction of pre-trial victim–off ender 
mediation for adults in more serious cases of every sort of crime. Whereas 
the minister of justice announced the introduction of ‘penal mediation’ 
as a modality of ‘praetorian probation’—a conditioned dismissal of rather 
lighter cases at the level of prosecution—the Louvain research explicitly 
aimed to explore the mutual infl uence of the communication between 
on the parties involved, and the judicial process of coming to a decision. 
Dealing now with cases like severe violence, armed robbery, rape and 
even murder, it was quite surprising to observe to what an extent our 
mediation practice confi rmed our previous fi ndings with juveniles, and 
opened up not so much a route to a practice of systematic ‘reparation’ for 
the victim as a perspective on a repositioned way of doing justice (Aertsen 
and Peters  1997 ; Van Garsse  2012 ). 
 In June 2005 the Belgian parliament approved a bill generalising the 
possibility for victim and off ender to request the intervention in their 
case of a neutral mediator, at any stage of criminal proceedings. It also 
formally allows judges and prosecutors to take a mediation outcome into 
account and obliges them to at least mention this in setting out the moti-
vation for their decision on a case. Mediation is now available for cases 
ranging from a simple insult up to murder. It can be initiated immedi-
ately after the event at the level of the police, during court proceedings or 
even during an off ender’s imprisonment. 
 Of course, mediation can also be combined with probation. Moreover, 
the mediation agreement could inspire the judge or the prosecutor to 
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consider certain probation conditions as an argument to for postponing 
or suspending imprisonment. In practice, however, such self-evident links 
between probation and mediation in whatever direction are rather weak. 
 Like probation, mediation appears to be vulnerable to recuperation 
by the still dominant repressive culture among the judiciary and policy- 
makers, as they seek clear-cut solutions rather than running the risk of 
exposure to critical questioning coming from victim, off ender or/and 
their respective contexts (Van Garsse  2012 ,  2014 ). More generally, it can-
not be denied that the promise of the legislation on mediation is far from 
being fulfi lled as far as it is refl ected in facts and fi gures, except perhaps in 
less serious cases (mostly involving young off enders), where the victim–
off ender dialogue is likely to come down to organising fi nancial compen-
sation to avoid further public intervention. In such circumstances, from 
the perspective of the judiciary, there is a kind of a logic in not mixing 
probation and mediation, but rather to use both in parallel way, as instru-
ments to combat the impression of impunity in minor cases, and to pre-
ventively ease as a matter of management and routine the victims’ voice. 
 Towards a Conclusion 
 Th is chapter has addressed a theme that lies in line with current develop-
ments in criminal policy worldwide. In search of arguments to rebuild or 
reinforce credibility, criminal justice as a whole is likely to present itself 
as providing a service to citizens, in terms of contributing to a climate 
of security and respect. Th e post-war rediscovery of the victim stressed 
their status as a holder of civil rights, in particular the right to have their 
 interests and personal integrity to be safeguarded. In the logic of the mar-
ket, paying for justice through taxation requires the satisfaction of the 
expectations of the ‘clients’. Th e same logic tends to provoke among the 
diff erent practices in doing justice a kind of competition in doing ‘bet-
ter’. In public debates and even among academics, victim satisfaction is 
quite an issue in the current evaluation of punishment, let alone of its 
alternatives. And for those who would still question or resist this develop-
ment, the popular literature on ‘restorative justice’ seems to be off ering 
plenty of reasons to cede victory. 
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 However, I haven’t got very far in answering the question this chapter 
started from. Whether probation has any impact on the reparation of 
victims and communities cannot be answered as such. As a practice of 
criminal justice, probation is always part of a culture in which its poten-
tial weight and its conceptual meaning are in a great part determined by 
its surroundings. Th is goes above all for restorative justice and the range 
of practices of mediation, which are in full development in almost every 
area where private interests risk collapse in an escalation of confl ict. Being 
a former practitioner and a promoter of victim–off ender mediation in 
Flanders, I have still been unable to resist the temptation to question 
critically the dynamics behind the current popularity, both of restoration 
and of repairing the victim, as criteria for successful (criminal) justice in 
general and probation in particular. 
 Looked at from a Belgian perspective, my brief overview has led to a 
sobering fi nding. However much we strive towards the common goal of 
discouraging the blind use of imprisonment, and do so by demonstrat-
ing, through constructive alternatives, its irrational character, these aren’t 
really joint eff orts. Th is fi nding is the more surprising when we look at 
the evident conceptual potential in combining their approaches by allow-
ing victim and off ender and their social surroundings to contribute in 
circumscribing and proposing suitable probation conditions. Th e other 
way round, probation could be a way of creating a proper framework 
to engage in getting victim and off ender alike to actually come to a way 
of ‘repairing’ that they perceive as fi tting the particular circumstances. 
Going back in history shows even more the communalities between 
both probation and mediation, as they were received in Belgium. Both 
appeared as coming from overseas, with some fl avour of the exotic. Both 
practices were balancing two attracting poles, that were likely to pro-
vide adversarial ideological standpoints on common ground. On the one 
hand they opened a perspective of substantially contributing to making 
the existing criminal justice system more eff ective and more tangible in 
its outcomes. On the other hand they both seemed to open a window 
on a radical repositioning of the existing power balances between the 
citizens and the state. It a fair to say that the awareness of the latter was at 
the same time most probably the reason why Belgian probation needed 
decades of political discussion to obtain a—still very restricting—legal 
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status. And it cannot be denied that the sudden breakthrough in media-
tion was part of the crisis management of a government suff ering a spec-
tacular loss of credibility. 
 As a last common feature, both probation and the embracement of 
restorative justice through mediation shared a prominent vulnerability 
to recuperation as friendly instruments within a commonsensical dis-
course. Undone from its political connotation as a counterbalance to 
sovereign state power, the notion of ‘community’ easily meets that of 
‘ Gemeinschaft ’. Probation discourse could never really escape the domi-
nant social-defence rationale under state-responsibility. Undone from its 
inherently unpredictable outcome, the current emphasis on evaluating 
restorative justice in terms of degree of ‘restoration’ and ‘reparation’ is 
likely to deprive mediation of its critical potential. Reducing a victim to a 
person ‘in need’ and whose ‘needs’ justify a professional ‘service’ prevents 
us from seeing ‘harm’ as the essence of what the problem of crime is all 
about. In the current state of the art, probation and mediation services 
alike on the one hand tend to survive only as friendly social-work prac-
tices on the margins of what ‘real justice’ is all about. Th ere lack of struc-
tural connection is making this scenario ever more probable, so that they 
both become competing fi shermen on the restricted lake of minor-case 
criminal justice that authority usually permits them to obtain their refer-
rals from. On the other hand, in striving to end this dominance by crimi-
nal justice, they tend to drown themselves in the seas of subjective needs, 
becoming pedagogues of reparation and satisfaction, desperately calling 
for a mandate to ‘rightly’ choose and select what they do and for whom. 
 As long as probation is applied by way of a lenient sentence in cases 
of minor off ences committed by youngsters or fi rst-off ending adults, it is 
doomed to be seen as a favour, in reality taking neither the victim’s per-
spective nor the off ender’s public responsibility seriously. 
 Obliging (or ‘proposing’) the off ender to reimburse the victim, to 
engage in mediation, or to do ‘something for the community’ inevitably 
presupposes the victim or the community to be carriers of needs and 
expectations fi tting their role in this controlling and vaguely educative 
approach. Th is does not mean that the actual application of probation 
doesn’t have any restorative value at all. Undoubtedly in quite some cases 
it might contribute to satisfactory reparation for victims and their sur-
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roundings aff ected by the event. But these benefi ts are not capable of 
compensating for the defensive signal transmitted by the restrictive use 
of probation’s restorative potential within criminal justice. Th e same goes 
for mediation tending to focus on individual needs rather than on com-
mon issues. 
 Th is approach sees probation not as a set of alternative measures to 
‘real’ punishment but as an appeal for civic participation, respecting legal 
protection and open to public control, in constructing and constantly 
reconstructing in practice what the notion of ’justice’ means in a demo-
cratic society. Th is kind of justice leaves great space for restoration, not as 
an easy way to get repaired or reimbursed, but as a process of reposition-
ing oneself in relation to the criminal event and its consequences, even in 
the most serious of crimes (Van Garsse  2004 ). My point of view doesn’t 
oppose the struggle for victims’ rights, but it does oppose the popularity 
of the humiliating and authoritarian identifi cation of victim assistance 
with victim protection. It sees probation work and mediation as a com-
mon social–pedagogical challenge related to the promotion of human 
dignity in terms of civic capacity and of democracy as a shared politi-
cal perspective. As such it is far from abstract. It might suffi  ce to listen 
carefully to ideas and to identify with reasoning expressed by victims, 
off enders and communities ‘beyond’ the roles given to them through 
routine-based off erings, however unlikely they might sound. 
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